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End-of-Life Decisionmaking for
Patients in Persistent Vegetative States:
A Comparative Analysis
By SUZANNE RODE*

Introduction
In spring of 2005, the United States and much of the world
witnessed the emotional dispute between Theresa Schiavo's husband
and parents over whether her life-sustaining medical treatment
should be withdrawn.' Although the Schiavo case marks a milestone
in end-of-life decisionmaking, the case did not significantly further or
change existing law. Florida law limits the decisionmaking authority
of guardians of incompetent patients to making only those decisions
consistent with the patient's "substituted judgment." In other words,
guardians may only terminate treatment based on clear and
convincing evidence that doing so is consistent with the nowincompetent patient's wishes, as expressed by them when competent.3
Schiavo's parents challenged her husband's decision to remove
treatment and the trial court ruled that her husband had presented
sufficient evidence that Schiavo would have wanted to discontinue

* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007. I
would like to thank Professor Lois Weithorn for her advice and support in the
development of this note.
1. For a summary of the Schiavo legal dispute, see Lois Shepherd, Conference
on the Law of Death and Dying: Terri Schiavo - Unsettling the Settled, 37 LoY. U.
CHI.L.J. 297, 297-312 (2006).
2. Id. at 298.
3. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (West 2006).
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life-sustaining treatment under the circumstances.4 The subsequent
appeals, challenges, and unprecedented legislative involvement did

not alter this initial judicial determination.

After four years of

litigation, doctors removed Schiavo's feeding tube, ending her supply
of nutrition and hydration, and allowing her to die.'

The attention that the Schiavo case has brought to end-of-life
decisionmaking presents a good opportunity to re-examine current
law. The United States is quite alone in its assertion that personal
autonomy is the primary value in making treatment decisions for
incompetent patients. Countries such as England, Australia, and
Canada give priority to a more general concept of the "best interest"
of a patient.6 "Best interest" is an objective assessment usually made

by doctors and courts. The subjective preference of the patient, if
available, is only one factor in making treatment decisions. Whether
an incompetent patient would want to refuse treatment is often
unclear, especially when the patient has left no written instructions.

When an incompetent patient in these countries has left no clear
preferences, other factors, such as whether the patient is likely to
regain decisionmaking capacity, and the views of family members, are
also considered in making treatment decisions. Alternatively Japan
places primary importance on the role of families in end-of-life
decisionmaking. 7 A family-centered approach considers the views of

family members inseparable from the patient, sometimes even to the
exclusion of the patient. The United States often ignores concerns of
relatives, and sometimes even medical opinions, in its zealous pursuit
of personal autonomy.
4. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
5. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957 (2005). On March 30, 2005,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied a final application for stay of enforcement of an
order to remove medical treatment from Schiavo.
6. Danuta Mendelson & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, A Comparative Study of the
Law of Palliative Care and End-of-Life Treatment, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 130, 133
(2003). See Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.) (holding that doctors may determine when treatment is in the best
interest of a patient); Messiha v. South East Health (2004) N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 1061
(Austi.) (holding that it is not in the best interest of a patient to continue lifesustaining treatment); Glenys Godlovitch, Ian Mitchell & Christopher James Doig,
Discontinuing Life Support in Comatose Patients, 26 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1172, 1172
(the best interest of a patient may be met by discontinuing life-sustaining treatment).
7. See generally Tomoaki Tsuchida, A Different Perspective on Advance
Directives, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND SURROGATE DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH
CARE: UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN 209 (Hans-Martin Sass, Robert M.
Veatch & Rihito Kimura eds. 1998).
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Part I of this note provides an overview of legal issues in end-oflife decisionmaking. I give a historical perspective of the issue in the
United States, distinguish "active" from "passive" euthanasia, and
describe the origin of the right of patients to refuse medical
treatment. Part II examines the concept of "substituted judgment,"
the subjective patient-centered approach to treatment decisions
which is the basis for U.S. healthcare laws. I explore the model
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and describe legislation
proposed in the wake of the Schiavo case. Part III examines the
objective patient-centered, or "best interest," approach to end-of-life
decisionmaking employed by the United Kingdom and Australia.
Part IV considers a family-centered approach to this issue, taken by
Japan and other East Asian countries.
In Part V, I explore how the "best interest" and family-centered
approaches to treatment for incompetent patients can inform the
decisionmaking process in the United States.
In making such
decisions, the United States should consider more than a patient's
right to privacy and self-determination. Interests of family members
should be formally incorporated into the decisionmaking process.
Additionally, continuing to treat patients in a persistent vegetative
state ("P.V.S.") is futile, and of no benefit to the patients personally.
I suggest that the default for such situations should change from
maintaining life support to discontinuing treatment.
Selfdetermination is only one of several interests that should be
considered in making end-of-life treatment decisions.
I.
A.

Legal Issues in End-of-Life Decisionmaking

Historical Perspective in the United States

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, medical end-of-life
decisionmaking underwent a critical period of change in the United
States. Decisions that had long been strictly private, made by doctors
and families at bedsides, were suddenly brought to the public's
attention.8 This shift was caused by developments in modern
medicine that now enable doctors to prolong life beyond the point
that many patients would find acceptable.
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Quinlan, a

8. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 3 (1991).
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seminal case about end-of-life decisionmaking.9 Karen Ann Quinlan
fell into a persistent vegetative state after collapsing and ceasing
breathing for two fifteen-minute periods. ° Artificial respiration,
nutrition, and hydration kept her alive." The court ordered that
Quinlan's respirator be withdrawn at the request of her guardian if
the responsible attending physicians concluded there was no

reasonable possibility of Quinlan ever emerging from her comatose
condition. 2

The

court

decided

that

because

Quinlan

was

incompetent, her constitutional right of privacy could be asserted on
her behalf by her guardian and family. 3 In asserting Quinlan's right,

the court noted that her family should render their best judgment as
to whether Quinlan would have wanted treatment removed under the
circumstances.'"
Public opinion generally supported the right of a patient to
refuse medical treatment, 5 and soon after the Quinlan decision,

California passed the Natural Death Act.

6

The Act was the first state

law legitimizing living wills, which give individuals the right to control
future medical treatment should they ever become incompetent.7
Many other states soon followed suit. 8 Although the general public

expressed a clear preference for greater control over decisions made
about dying, U.S. hospitals differed greatly in implementing such
policies.' 9
In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cruzan, the second

9. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976).
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id. at 25.
12. Id. at 55.
13. Id. at 41-42.
14. Id. at 42. Artificial respiration was the only treatment at issue; Quinlan's
parents did not seek to remove artificial nutrition and hydration. After doctors
removed Quinlan's respirator, she unexpectedly continued to live another 10 years
and did not die until 1985.
15. JENNIFER M. SCHERER & RITA J. SIMON, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO
DIE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 8 (1999) (citing The Los Angeles Times, April 3, 1975, in
which a poll indicated 87 percent of respondents favored passive euthanasia and 63
percent believed terminally ill patients had the right to receive medication to end
their lives).
16. Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 6478 (repealed in 2000 and
superseded by CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600 - 4740 (West 2000)).
17. Id.
18. SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 15, at 8 (Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas passed similar laws in 1977).
19. Id.

2007]

End-of-Life Decisionmaking

landmark case regarding the right of incompetent patients to refuse
medical treatment. ° Nancy Cruzan suffered severe injuries in an
automobile accident, which rendered her incompetent.2' After it
became apparent that she would never regain her mental faculties,
her parents sought to have her artificial nutrition and hydration
removed.2 The Court concluded that Cruzan's parents could not
withdraw treatment because they had not met the standard of proof
required; her parents did not present "clear and convincing" evidence
that Cruzan would have refused treatment under such
circumstances.23 Although incompetent individuals do have the right
to refuse medical treatment, a state may legitimately require "clear
and convincing" evidence that the patient would have decided to
forego life-sustaining treatment under the circumstances.
B. Distinction Between Active and Passive Euthanasia
Generally, the "right to die" has been widely recognized only as
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and does not
encompass the right to take lethal drugs. Passive euthanasia, or
refusing treatment, is usually associated with "letting die," and active
euthanasia,
or helping a patient die, is typically recognized as
''
"killing. 5
Active euthanasia describes an affirmative act which results in
another's death, such as a doctor's administration of lethal injection
to a patient.2 Physician-assisted suicide usually refers to a physician
prescribing lethal drugs for a patient, but not actually administering
the drugs. Active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are legal
under certain circumstances in only a few countries and one state

20. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
21. Id. at 265.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 285.
24. Id. at 278, 280. Cruzan's parents brought the case to trial again and presented
testimony that Cruzan would have decided to forego artificial nutrition and hydration
under the circumstances. The trial court ordered treatment be removed and Cruzan
died in 1990.
25. THE PRESIDENT'S
CAREGIVING
IN
OUR

COUNCIL

ON

BIOETHICS,

ch.
<www.bioethics.gov/reports/taking-care/chapter3.htm>.
26. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
AGING

SOCIETY

TAKING

3

(2005),

CARE:

ETHICAL

available

at

OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECISIONS TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL

ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
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within the United States.27 The moral and legal prohibition of actively
taking another life is deeply rooted in Western society and the
limitation on individual self-determination
2 8 is generally viewed as an
acceptable cost of securing this protection.
Passive euthanasia describes an omission that leads to the death
of another, such as withholding medical treatment and allowing a
patient to die of "natural" causes. 9 Traditionally, the law has not
imposed criminal or civil liability on individuals for failing to rescue a
dying person. The withdrawal of treatment, although an affirmative
action, is distinguishable from active euthanasia because the
underlying disease will ultimately bring about the patient's death, not
the action of removing life support. °
C. The Right of Competent Patients to Refuse Treatment
Justice Cardozo announced in 1914 that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body...."3 All common law and most civil law
countries presume that every adult possesses the mental capacity to
refuse medical treatment, absent rebuttal of this presumption.32
Patients retain this right even if refusal of treatment will certainly
cause death.33
The principle of personal autonomy forms the basis of the right
to refuse medical treatment, including artificial respiration, nutrition,
and hydration. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed in Cruzan that "a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment."3 This constitutional right to
personal autonomy is a "liberty interest" protected by the due process

27. SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 15, at 104-07. Active euthanasia is currently
legal under certain circumstances in Belgium, Columbia, Japan, and The
Netherlands. In addition to the countries listed above, physician-assisted suicide is
legal in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Oregon.
28. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. See generally Daniel Callahan, Killing and Allowing to Die, 19 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (1989); Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 11 (1992); James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975).

31.
32.
33.
34.

Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,129-30 (1914).
Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 133.
Id.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 Similarly, in 2002, the
European Court of Human Rights upheld the right to refuse medical
treatment based on personal autonomy in Pretty v. United Kingdom.36
The European right to refuse medical treatment is rooted in the
privacy guarantees in Article Eight of the European Convention on
Human Rights.37
D. The Right of Incompetent Patientsto Refuse Treatment
The right of incompetent patients to refuse medical treatment
also rests on the principle of autonomy, though by definition an
incompetent patient can no longer form and communicate an opinion.
Asserting an incompetent patient's right to autonomy may be
achieved through use of an advance directive or living will.
An advance directive is a written or oral declaration by an
individual capable of making informed and voluntary decisions.38 The
declaration details the future care an individual would like to receive
should he or she become incompetent, and may encompass both
"instruction directives" and "proxy directives."39
Instruction
directives express an individual's treatment preferences in the form of
either general statements about basic values to help guide others in
making decisions, or very detailed directions about how to proceed in
a variety of specific medical situations.0 People who make proxy
directives, also known as "health care powers of attorney," designate
another person to make medical decisions on their behalf should they
ever become incapacitated. 41 Living wills function the same as
advance directives except they are always written down.'
Although living wills have been widely promoted as a sensible

35. Id.
36. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2346/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002).
37. European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S.
No.5 ("(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... and
that (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society...").
38. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICs, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL
CAREGIVING
IN
OUR
AGING
SOCIETY,
ch.
2 (2005),
available
at
<www.bioethics.gov/reports/taking-care/chapter2.html>.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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precaution, most people still do not create one.4' Because of this, we
necessarily look elsewhere for direction in how to effectuate an
incompetent patient's right to self-determination in receiving future
medical care." Evidence that a patient informally expressed views at
a time when she was competent may be used to decide whether to
discontinue artificial nutrition, hydration, or respiration.
For
example, a family member might recall that a patient once
mentioned, "I would never want to live as a vegetable." That
statement could be used to prove that the incompetent patient would
have decided to forego treatment under certain circumstances. When
disputes about whether to withhold treatment arise, courts seriously
consider evidence of oral statements made to family and friends.45
Because of the infinite varieties of potential medical situations,
relying on a casual comment about being a "vegetable," or even
relying on an advance directive, often rests on a fiction that the
incompetent patient has effectively exercised her personal autonomy.
For this reason, substantial problems arise when we rely only on the
principles of "personal autonomy" and substituted judgment when
making end-of-life decisions for incompetent patients. Appointing a
healthcare proxy might seem like a good way to avoid this fiction, but
a proxy decisionmaker is usually only allowed to make healthcare
decisions that the patient would have chosen for himself or herself
anyway. In order to avoid this fiction and to make better treatment
decisions, personal autonomy should only be one of several interests
and considerations taken into account when deciding whether to
terminate artificial nutrition and hydration.
H. Subjective Patient-Centered Approach:
Substituted Judgment
In the United States, we place great value on the right of
individuals to make their own voluntary and informed healthcare
decisions, a value strongly tied to our liberty interest implied in the
Constitution. In Cruzan, the Court relied on the principle of respect
43. Muriel R. Gillick, Advance Care Planning,350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1470, 147071 (2004) (only 15 percent to 20 percent of Americans create a living will).
44. See Lois Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in End-of-Life
Decisionmaking:Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 575, 575 (2005).
45. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(Schiavo's few oral statements to family and friends amounted to clear and
convincing evidence that under the circumstances she would have refused constant
nursing care and preferred a natural death process).
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for autonomous choice and gave no weight to the wishes of the family
or physicians." In the absence of an advance directive, many states
provide a hierarchical list of surrogates, but some state laws do not
even allow surrogates to consider the objective "best interest" of the
patient; a surrogate may only use the substituted judgment of the
patient.47 A surrogate should not allow his or her own interest to
affect the decision about whether or not to withhold treatment.
As a result of well-publicized cases such as Quinlan and Cruzan,
all states now have legislation authorizing the use of some sort of
advance healthcare directive. Most states authorize use of powers of
attorney for medical treatment decisions, and all but three states
authorize the execution of living wills."
Many state laws also
designate a list of family members, and sometimes physicians or close
friends, to act as surrogates and make medical treatment decisions for
incompetent patients. 49 States have varying restrictions on the types
of treatment that may be withheld, resulting in a highly fragmented
system. °
A.

Model Rules: Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act

Responding to this need for consistency in the execution of living
wills, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
("UHCDA") in 1993."' The Commissioners drafted the UHCDA in
an attempt to simplify existing law and provide a national model for
states to adapt. By the time the Commissioners created and approved
the UHCDA, however, most states had already passed legislation

46. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990).
47. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990) ("The
surrogate decisionmaker must be confident that he or she can and is voicing the
patient'sdecision"); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (the case "is about Theresa Schiavo's right to make her own decision,
independent of her parents and independent of her husband").
48. David M. English, The Uniform Health-CareDecisions Act and Its Progressin
the States, 3 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. PROBATE & PROPERTY (2001), available at
<www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2001/01mj/Olmjenglish.html>
(Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York do not currently authorize living wills); see
also H.B. 5049 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (2005) (House bill introduced in New York that
would recognize advance directives).
49. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Prefatory Note (1993), available at
<www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/uhcda93.htm> [hereinafter UHCDA].
50. Id.; English, supra note 48, at 48.
51. English, supra note 48, at 48.
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regarding advance directives. These states had no inclination to begin
the lawmaking process again merely to achieve the modest
improvements articulated in the UHCDA.5 Nevertheless, the Act
has proven influential in creating state law; seven states have adopted
the UHCDA,53 the most recent being Alaska, which enacted its law in
2004.m California has adopted much of the UHCDA, but does not
include the list of priority surrogates in the UHCDA.55
The first self-proclaimed principle of the UHCDA is "the right of
a competent individual to decide all aspects of his or her own health
care in all circumstances, including the right to decline health care...
even if death ensues. 5 6 An agent (an individual designated in a
power of attorney for healthcare), must make healthcare decisions in
accordance with the patient's individual instructions, if any, and any
other wishes of the patient known by the agent.57 If the patient does
not have an advance directive and the agent has no knowledge of his
or her interests, then the decision must be made in accordance with
the agent's determination of the patient's "best interest. ' Even in a
case where an agent is forced to determine a patient's "best interest,"
however, an agent must still consider the patient's personal values to
the extent known to the agent.59 These rules are consistent with the
importance Americans place on personal autonomy.
In cases where no agent or guardian has been appointed, the
UHCDA provides a list of potential surrogates in descending order of
priority.'
Surrogates are similar to agents, and have the same
obligation to consider the wishes of the patient.61 If available, the
spouse of the patient acts as surrogate (unless legally separated), and
then an adult child, a parent, an adult sibling, and finally an "adult
who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient., 62 In the
case of a dispute between family members of the same rank (such as

52.
53.
Maine,
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. (the UHCDA has been adopted by Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii,
Mississippi, and New Mexico).
ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.10 (West 2004) (amended 2006).
See generally CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4806 (West 2000) (amended 2007).
UHCDA, supra note 49.
Id. § 2(e).

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 5(b).
61. Id. § 5(f).
62. Id. § 5(b)-(c).
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siblings), the healthcare provider should comply with the decision of a
majority.63 If the family members in that rank are evenly divided,
then they, and all other individuals having lower priority, are
disqualified from making the decision. 6' The UHCDA does not
indicate who instead would then have authority to make healthcare
decisions.
B. Recent State Laws on Withholding Treatment from Incompetent
Patients
Before the Schiavo case, end-of-life decisionmaking law
appeared to be relatively settled.6' Although advance directive
legislation is largely inconsistent, essentially all U.S. law has been
established on the accepted principle that the patient has ultimate
authority in determining his or her own care. Commentators and
activists in the field of end-of-life care had shifted their focus to issues
like physician-assisted suicide and palliative care. 66 The intense
exposure and public response to the Schiavo case produced a new
surge of attention and legislation around advance directives and endDuring the Schiavo publicity, average
of-life decisionmaking.
monthly requests for information on living wills and healthcare
proxies from Last Acts Partnership, a Web-based organization
providing free information on end-of-life issues, went from 3,500 to
20,000.67
In 2005 and 2006, over twenty states proposed legislation to
address these issues. A number of these laws focus on promoting and
facilitating the creation of advance directives through the DMV, by
registering on the Internet, or by requiring insurance providers to

make advance directive forms available to their customers. 61 Other
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. § 5(e).
Id.
Shepherd, supra note 1, at 299.
Id. at 299-300.
Arlene Judith Kloyzko, Science Matters, FINANCIAL TIMES WEEKEND
MAGAZINE, July 3, 2004, at 11.
68. S.B. 415 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (would establish a registry system
for advance directives and require the DMV to provide information about advance
directives to applicants for vehicle registration, driver's licenses, and ID cards);
S.B. 1272 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (would establish an Advance Health Care
Directive Registry Internet Web site); S. Con. Res. 12, 143rd Gen. Assem. (Del.
2005) (would create a task force to recommend a feasible way to implement system
for individuals to complete an advance directive when applying for a driver's license
or ID card); S.B. 195, 143rd Gen. Assem. (Del. 2005) (would allow designation on
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laws specify restrictions on withholding or withdrawing artificial
nutrition and hydration, such as establishing a presumption that
treatment could never be removed in the absence of specific
In Oklahoma, a bill under
instructions left by the patient.69
consideration would simply delete "hydration" from advance

directive forms and completely prohibit hydration as a substance that
could be withdrawn. 70 In Virginia, the legislature is considering a bill

that would prohibit courts from naming guardians that have a
"material interest" in the death of the incompetent patient.7' With
this restriction, finding an appropriate guardian for a patient who
does not have some interest in the patient's death would be difficult

since those closest to a patient are likely to be heirs to the estate. A
bill in Michigan would prohibit a patient's spouse who was having an
affair from discontinuing life-sustaining treatment, a direct reference
to the Schiavo case.72 Legislators in New Jersey, South Carolina, and
Florida proposed bills with the title "Starvation and Dehydration of
Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act." These bills reframe
driver's license or ID card warning paramedics of advance directive); H.B. 1011,
108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (requires application for driver's license or ID card to
include option for applicant to request advance directive to be noted on license or
card); H.B. 1567, 23rd State Leg. (Haw. 2005) (would mandate healthcare providers
to present advance directive to persons under care); H. Con. Res. 5031, 81st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005) (would urge health insurance providers to encourage insured
individuals to have advance directive); H. B. 2714, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005)
(would require certain Medicaid applicants to have an advance directive); H. B. 319,
420th Sess. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006) and S.B. 236, 420th Sess. Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006) (both would establish an advance directive registry in
the Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene and provide advance directive notations on
driver's licenses or ID cards); H.B. 894 (Mo. 2005) (would provide all driver's license
applicants with information on advance directives and designating a healthcare
proxy); H.B. 742, 59th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005) (would establish a healthcare
declaration registry relating to use of life-sustaining treatment); Leg. B. 879, 99th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005) (would provide for notation of advance directive on
driver's license and information on advance directives to applicants); S.B. 2369, 211th
Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004) (passed in 2005, comprehensive healthcare act
defining advance directives); H.B. 5049, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006) (would
require healthcare providers to execute advance directives); H.B. 200, 68th Biennial
Sess. (Vt. 2005) (would establish a study of surrogacy for healthcare decisions and
establish an electronic registry for advance directives).
69. H.B. 1332, 23rd Leg. (Haw. 2005); H.B. 2848, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2005); H.B. 501 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005); H.B. 973, 93rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006);
H.B. 7912, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H.B. 216, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2005).
70. H.B. 1567, 50th Leg. Sess., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2005).
71. H.B. 308 (Va. 2004).
72. H.B. 4752, 93rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005).
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termination of some forms of treatment as "cruelty to persons with
disabilities., 73 This kind of legislation obscures the important issue of
helping individuals and families come to a consensus during an
already difficult period.
III. Objective Patient-Centered Approach: Best Interest
The objective patient-centered approach to end-of-life
decisionmaking is characterized by an overall assessment of the best
interest of an incompetent patient. Other common law countries such
as the United Kingdom and Australia generally recognize this
approach.'
Factors that determine "best interest" may include
whether the patient is likely to regain capacity to make decisions for
herself, any evidence of the patient's wishes and feelings, and the
views of family members. This approach also incorporates the
principle of personal autonomy. Where an incompetent patient has
expressly left instructions about whether to refuse treatment under
specific circumstances, those wishes should be honored. Absent an
advance directive, or in the event of unclear advance instructions, the
physician or surrogate does not have to pretend to promote the
subjective intent of a patient when deciding whether to withhold
medical treatment. Physicians in these countries generally have more
legally recognized powers in deciding whether to terminate treatment
than they would have in the United States.
A. Determining the "Best Interest" of an Incompetent Patient
According to practice guidelines provided by the General
Medical Council of the United Kingdom, the senior clinician
responsible for a patient's care has the responsibility to make a
decision about what course of action would be in the patient's best
interest.75 The clinician should consider the input of the healthcare
team and those people close to the patient for any information
relevant to the decision, but ultimately the clinician determines how
73. H.B. 2117, 213th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006); H.B. 4013, 116th Sess. Gen.
Assem. (S.C. 2005); H.B. 701, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); S.B. 2128, 107th Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2005).
74. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 137, 139.
75. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFEPROLONGING TREATMENTS: GOOD PRACTICE IN DECISION-MAKING para. 32 (2002),

available at <www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/current/library/witholdinglifeprolonging_
guidance.asp> (the General Medical Council licenses doctors to practice medicine in
the United Kingdom).
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much weight to attach to each person's views. The Mental Capacity
Act, passed in the United Kingdom in 2005, specifies the factors that
should be considered when determining an incompetent patient's best
interest.' Those factors include the person's "past and present wishes
and feelings," the "beliefs and values that would be likely to influence
his decision if he had capacity," and the views of "anyone engaged in
caring for the person or interested in his welfare."78
Until the Mental Capacity Act was ratified, England did not have
a statute legitimizing living wills. The Mental Capacity Act now
recognizes both living wills and healthcare proxies.79 In England, the
power of advance directives is much more restricted than in the
United States, though. Advance directives regarding life-sustaining
treatment are only recognized in England if the directives are in
writing and a witness has acknowledged the patient's signature.1 O
Furthermore, an advance directive in England must specifically
address the circumstances of the situation in order for it to be
effective." An advance directive will not be applicable if:
1) [T]he treatment is not the treatment specified in the advance
decision;
2) [Any circumstances specified in the advance directive are
absent, or
3) [T]here are reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances
exist which [the patient] did not anticipate at the time of the
advance decision and which would have affected his decision had
he anticipated them.82
English law does not recognize a patient's wishes if the patient did not
anticipate the present circumstances. Additionally, a decision about
whether an advance directive is applicable need only be made on
"reasonable grounds." By contrast, the United States makes every
effort to infer a patient's subjective intent from written and oral

76. Id. at para. 53-54.
77. See generally Mental Capacity Act, 2005, ch. 9 § 4(1)-(6) (Eng.), available at
<www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/20050009.htm>.

78. Id. § 4(5)-(7).
79. Id. §§ 9-11,24-26.

80. Id. § 25(6)(a)-(d).
81. Id. § 25(4)(a)-(b).
82. Id. § 25(4)(a)-(c).
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statements, and will usually accept such statements as "evidence" of

the patient's wishes under the circumstances.
B.

Court Involvement in End-of-Life Decisions
In 1993, the House of Lords decided Airedale NHS Trust v.

Bland, a case which parallels Cruzan in its importance and subject
matter.' Injuries suffered by 17-year-old Anthony Bland as a result
of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster in 1989 left him in a

permanent vegetative state.84 His father thought that his son
"certainly would not want to be left like he [was]" and appealed to
the court for authority to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.85 The
House of Lords declared that existence in a permanent vegetative
state does not benefit a patient, and therefore the doctors responsible
for Bland's treatment had neither a duty, nor any entitlement, to

continue life-sustaining treatment. 86
The House of Lords acknowledged that Bland had never
indicated his wishes should he ever become incompetent," and that "a
patient unable to choose cannot himself exercise his right of selfdetermination."'
In addition to personal autonomy, the House of
Lords considered Bland's right to be respected, his right to be wellregarded by others, and his right to "avoid unnecessary humiliation
and degrading invasion of his body for no good purpose."'8 The
decision refers to the U.S. Supreme Court's dissents in Cruzan,

83. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.).
84. Id. at 789.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 885 (Lord Brown-Wilkinson) ("[it is perfectly reasonable for the
responsible doctors to conclude that there is no affirmative benefit to Anthony Bland
in continuing the invasive medical procedures necessary to sustain his life.... [T]hey
are neither entitled nor under a duty to continue such medical care"); see also id. at
815 (Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.) ("[A] doctor who discontinues artificial feeding of a
P.V.S. patient, after a lapse of time which entitles him to be sure that there is no hope
of recovery, in pursuance of a conscientious and proper judgment that such
discontinuance is in the patient's best interests, is in my view guilty of no crime"); id.
at 823 (Butler-Sloss L.J.) ("The duty of the doctors towards a P.V.S. patient at the
extreme end of the spectrum does not extend to prolonging his life at all costs"); id.
at 858 (Lord Keith of Kinkel) ("The decision whether or not the continued treatment
and care of a P.V.S. patient confers any benefit on him is essentially one for the
practitioners in this case").
87. Id. at 797 (Sir Stephen Brown P.).
88. Id. at 822 (Butler-Sloss L.J.).
89. Id.
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specifically citing Justice Stevens' dissent highlighting an individual's
own interest in how he or she will die and be remembered9
According to the House of Lords, the principle of the sanctity of life
is neither absolute nor violated by ceasing medical treatment to a
P.V.S. patient.91
The Bland decision also recognizes that "good medical practice,"
accepted by a large and responsible body of medical opinion, should
guide treatment choices.' Professional medical standards constitute
an important factor in determining whether or not discontinuing
treatment reflects the best interest of the patient. The British court
plays a supervisory role by acting as a safeguard for public
reassurance.93 Until a body of experience and practice has been built
up, the House of Lords advises that a medical practitioner
considering discontinuing treatment of a P.V.S. patient should make
an application to the court, regardless of the existence of a dispute.'
Finally, in determining Bland's "best interest," the House of
Lords also considers the interests of his family. 5 Similar to U.S.
90. See id. at 821 (Butler-Sloss L.J.) (referring to J. Stevens' dissent in Cruzan);
see also id. at 803-04 (Sir Stephen Brown P.) (referring to J. Brennan's dissent in
Cruzan in which he questions whether existence in a persistent vegetative state is
"life").
91. Id. at 826 (Hoffman L.J.) ("[T]he sanctity of life is only one of a cluster of
ethical principles which we apply to decisions about how we should live. Another is
respect for the individual human being and in particular for his right to choose how
he should live his own life. We call this individual autonomy of the right to selfdetermination. And another principle, closely connected, is respect for the dignity of
the individual human being: our belief that quite irrespective of what the person
concerned may think about it, it is wrong for someone to be humiliated or treated
without respect for his value as a person").
92. Id. at 884 (Lord Brown-Wilkinson) (Doctors responsible for Bland's
treatment were not under a duty to continue life-sustaining treatment as long as the
decision was "in accordance with a respectable body of medical opinion and is
reasonable"); see also id. at 884 (Sir Stephen Brown P) (accepting a clinical decision
"arrived at in the honest and responsible exercise of [Bland's doctor's] duty of caring
for his patient").
93. Id. at 853 (Butler-Sloss L.J) ("The court's function in the present case... is
not to approve or disapprove of the medical care and treatment decision, but to
declare whether the course proposed is in the best interests of the patient and is
therefore lawful") (emphasis in original).
94. Id.; see generally Bryan Jennett, Should Cases of Permanent Vegetative State
Still Go to Court?, 319 BRITISH MED. J. 796 (1999) (arguing that where there is not a
dispute regarding withdrawal of treatment, court involvement should not be
required, citing U.S. practice as a relevant example).
95. Id. at 817 (Lord Butler Sloss L.J) ("The views of the family must always be
treated with respect and will be an important consideration in the overall
assessment").
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courts, English courts look to the patient's family to help understand
what treatment choices a patient might have made under the
circumstances. 96 Additionally the House of Lords considers the effect
that Bland's ordeal has on his family, and how treatment decisions
might alleviate their suffering.7 The court frames the issue of the
family's suffering within Bland's interest; Bland's personal interest
includes the welfare of his family. In deciding whether treatment
reflects Bland's best interest, the House of Lords considers whether
the treatment confers a benefit on him, whether Bland would have

wanted to continue treatment, whether continuing treatment is "good
medical practice," and whether persisting with treatment serves the

family's interests.
In Australia, courts have not traditionally played a role in
deciding whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment,

but recently Australian courts have been hearing more and more of
these cases. 98 In 2004, the Supreme Court of New South Wales
decided Messiha v. South East Health, in which the family of a man in
a persistent vegetative state challenged the doctor's decision to

remove an artificial respirator. 99 The court found that the guiding
principle for determining whether to continue treatment is the best
interest of the patient, and that medical opinion carries great
evidentiary weight.' The court noted:
[I]t would be an unusual case where the Court would act against
what is unanimously held by medical experts as an appropriate

96. Id. at 796 (Lord Brown-Wilkinson) ("Although Anthony Bland himself
cannot express any view it should be inferred in the light of the medical evidence as
well as of the evidence of his own father and mother that the prolongation of the
present treatment is not in his best interests") (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 813 (Lord Thomas Bingham M.R) ("[AIn objective assessment of Mr.
Bland's best interests, viewed through his eyes.., would in my opinion give weight
to... the prolonged ordeal imposed on all members of his family... particularly on
his parents").
98. Lindy Willmott, Ben White & Donna Cooper, Interveners or Interferers:
Intervention in Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 4, 597, 598 (2005) (citing the trend in Australia for
decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment to come before the courts and
recommending a systematic approach to these interventions); Thomas A. Faunce &
Cameron Stewart, The Messiha and Schiavo Cases: Third-party Ethical and Legal
Interventions in Futile Care Disputes, 183 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 5, 261 (2005) (referring
to the increasing demand by relatives for continued treatment of incompetent
patients).
99. Messiha v. South East Health (2004) N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 1061 (Austrl.).
100. Id. at para. 25.
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treatment regime for the patient in order to preserve the life of a
terminally ill patient in a deep coma where there is no real prospect
of recovery.
The court acknowledged the wishes of the family in the opinion, but
concluded that if the court believes the physician's decision to
withdraw treatment serves the patient's best interest, then the
decision constitutes "principally a matter for the expertise of
professional medical practitioners." 02
In guidelines for end-of-life decisionmaking, the New South
Wales Department of Health delineates approaches for resolving
disputes between family members and practitioners. 3 The guidelines
propose:
1) Giving families time to come to terms with the impending death
of the patient;
2) Obtaining a second medical opinion;
3) Setting clear timeframes for review before possible withdrawal
of treatment;
4) Involving an independent and senior health care professional to
address concerns of family members;
5) Possibly transferring the patient to another facility if these steps
do not resolve the situation;
6) Legal intervention as a last resort.
The guidelines also suggest that when a dispute arises, counselors
should be available to support the family and help them to "resolve
their difficulties in accepting the reality of the patient's impending
death."' 4 Like the courts, the New South Wales Department of
Health proposes that the family's concerns should be considered and
addressed, but that the physician ultimately determines when
discontinuing life-sustaining treatment serves the patient's best
interest.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. New South Wales Department of Health, Guidelinesfor End-of-life Care and

Decisionmaking, § 6.5 (2005), available at <www.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2005/pdf/
end of life care.pdf> (the New South Wales Department of Health monitors
performance of the New South Wales public health system).
104. Id. at § 6.3.
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IV. Family-Centered Approach
The subjective wishes of the patient form the basis of the
"substituted judgment" approach to end-of-life decisionmaking,
whereas the "best interest" approach relies on an objective
assessment of the patient's situation. A family-centered approach
deems the interests of the patient's family members inseparable from
those of the patient. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Australia, the family does have some function in treatment options.
These countries recognize family members as being more
knowledgeable about the values and preferences of the patient, and
as being most concerned about the patient's best interests. These
countries also recognize an inviolability of the family unit."" Yet
these considerations remain predominantly based on the interests of
the patient and do not regard the subjective preferences of family
members. In other countries, particularly East and Southeast Asian
countries, the interests of family members play a central role in endof-life decisionmaking, and often supplant the personal interests of
the patient.
A. Community Ethos
When considering the effects of integrating aspects of a familycentered approach to end-of-life decisionmaking, it is important to
understand the background against which this approach operates. In
East and Southeast Asian countries, individuals typically identify
themselves in terms of their relationships with others, much more so
°
than in the United States.'O
Japanese culture considers it social
anathema to act individually without regarding the viewpoints of
one's family, or even of the community. Members of societies that
emphasize maintaining good familial and community relationships
tend to avoid outright confrontation with others. These societies
obscure the boundary of "person," a boundary clearly demarcated in
American culture and accompanied by an awareness of rights, selfdetermination, and privacy.
105. Ho Mun Chan, Sharing Death and Dying: Advance Directives, Autonomy and
the Family, 18 BIOETHICS 89, 98 (2004).
106. Id. at 92 (citing A.E. BUCHANAN & D.W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS:
THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 136 (1990)).
107. Id. at 99.
108. Tsuchida, supra note 7, at 210.
109. Gen Ohi, Advance Directives and the Japanese Ethos, in ADVANCE
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B. Advance Directives and the Role of Courts
In Japan, an advance directive has never been considered a
legally binding expression of a patient's intention."'
Several
considerations, all of which rest on the importance of identifying the
self within context of relationships, inhibit the utilization of advance
directives. First, a patient's physician or family rarely informs the
patient of his or her terminal illness, so the need for an advance
directive rarely seems pressing. In Japan and other East and
Southeast Asian countries, people consider the news of impending
death too depressing to reveal to a patient, although many patients
probably suspect it."' Second, their cultural aversion to drafting
written advance instructions inhibits utilization of advance
directives."2 Individuals regard verbal instruction as an adequate
means of communication with family members and suggesting
instructions need to be in writing might be regarded as a display of
distrust."3
In a study conducted in Japan and Taiwan, most
individuals asked about advance directives indicated that oral
expression would be adequate and many replied there existed no
need to leave any directive."'
Finally, telling the truth about a terminal illness, whether by a
family member informing the patient, or the patient telling others,
creates a burden on both sides that threatens the cohesiveness of the
community."5 Acknowledging the terminally ill state of a patient
highlights the differences between patient and other members of the
group, resulting in an inability for the patient to relate to others."6
DIRECTIVES AND SURROGATE DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE: UNITED STATES,
GERMANY, AND JAPAN 175, 176 (Hans-Martin Sass, Robert M. Veatch & Rihito

Kimura eds. 1998).
110. Rihito Kimura, Death, Dying, and Advance Directives in Japan, in ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES AND SURROGATE DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE: UNITED STATES,
GERMANY, AND JAPAN 187, 190 (Hans-Martin Sass, Robert M. Veatch & Rihito

Kimura eds. 1998).
111. Ohi, supra note 109, at 178.
112. Id. at 179.
113. Id.
114. Id. Although 89 percent of Japanese and 72 percent of Taiwanese in the
study indicated they would prefer pain control rather than life-prolonging treatment
if they were diagnosed as terminally ill, 58 percent of Japanese and 69 percent of
Taiwanese replied that oral expression of their treatment preferences was adequate,
and 21 percent and 10 percent respectively said there was no need to leave any
advance directive (citing Gen Ohi & T.Y. Chiu (1995) unpublished data).
115. Id. at 181.
116. Id. at 180-81.
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One must behave as a consistent, useful, and respected
member of
7
the community in order to remain a part of that group.
Typically, doctors only tell the patient's family members about
the truth of a terminal illness."8 Family members either come to a
decision regarding future treatment after consulting with the
physician, or the family simply leaves the decision up to the
physician."' Traditionally, the patient's unquestioning trust of the
physician to make treatment decisions on his behalf forms the basis of
physician-patient relationships in Japan."
Therefore, while
physicians may consult family members about a patient who was
never informed about his condition, physicians often make ultimate
treatment determinations.
Litigation regarding decisions about whether to discontinue
treatment of an incompetent patient rarely occurs in Japan because
society regards such decisions as medical assessments confined to the
authority of physicians.'
For the most part the Japanese medical
profession possesses freedom to practice medicine without
intervention from law, religion, or economics, and this paternalistic
behavior has been generally accepted.'22 Use of advance directives
may still begin to take hold, though. Economic affluence and urban
isolation has led to some loosening of the group ethos, and an
increasing number of therapeutic alternatives may motivate patients
23
to communicate with physicians and ask for specific treatment.
V. Refraning the Approach to End-of-Life Decisionmaking
In the United States, the legal consensus is that the right to selfdetermination is the primary value for determining whether to
remove life-sustaining treatment from individuals who have lost their
capacity to make medical care decisions. This right has triumphed
over other values that might guide our thinking in this arena, and
often forces us to rely on a fiction about what the patient would want.
I propose that we look to other countries to explore how we might

117. Id.
118. Tsuchida, supra note 7, at 210; Chan, supra note 105, at 94 (based on author's
field visits to Beijing and Hong Kong).
119. Tsuchida, supranote 7, at 210.
120. Kimura, supra note 110, at 190-91.
121. Id. at 200.
122. Id.
123. Ohi, supra note 109, at 183-84.
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shift our stance to more appropriately address the issue of treatment
for P.V.S. patients and their families.
A.

"Permanent Vegetative State" is Different Than "Disabled"

Recognizing personal autonomy presents few problems in the
circumstance of a competent patient who has clarified his or her
treatment preferences. However self-determination cannot serve as a
guiding principle under circumstances involving an incompetent
patient who has not expressed his or her treatment preferences.
Substituted judgment as a standard for making treatment decisions
for P.V.S. patients proves especially problematic since the patient
may live for years impervious to his or her own life or surroundings.
Erring on the side of "life" means family members and society must
potentially care for an unresponsive and unfeeling patient for
decades. For many patients, this existence would be considered an
affront to personal dignity and an abuse in itself.
. How do we resolve the dilemma of recognizing patient autonomy
and making the best treatment decisions for incompetent patients?
We must recognize that P.V.S. patients present different treatment
issues than disabled or terminally ill patients.'24 In the United States,
substituted judgment constitutes the primary value considered in
12
treatment of both P.V.S. patients and patients who are "disabled.' 1
Courts in England, Australia, and Canada have been more willing
than U.S. courts to recognize that treatment for P.V.S. patients
should be different than treatment for "disabled" patients.1 2 6 In
Bland, the court took a range of circumstances into account, including
the likelihood of recovery, the dignity of the patient, the
recommendation of doctors, and what Bland would likely have
wanted under the circumstances even though he had never made his
wishes known. 127 Such an approach does raise concerns about courts
making value judgments, but when a clear medical consensus about a
patient's condition exists, courts should not ignore (or pretend to

124. See Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative
State - And Allowing Them to Die, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 631, 649-53 (2006)
(explaining that people in a P.V.S. state should be treated as a unique class because
they all have the same complete lack of experiential interests).
125. A "disabled" patient is aware of his or her surroundings, but may not be able
to communicate preferences.
126. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 138-41.
127. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, § III-B (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.).
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ignore) those facts. Moreover, courts already make value judgments
when determining whether evidence based on hearsay qualifies as
proof that a patient would have decided to forego treatment.
To address this issue, Professor Lois Shepherd proposes a change
in the systematic default of continuing life-sustaining treatment for
P.V.S. patients. Instead of asking whether a patient would benefit
from removing life-sustaining treatment, we should ask whether the
patient would benefit from continued treatment.'28 Changing the
presumption would place the burden of proof on those challenging
the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment. Instead of requiring
clear and convincing evidence that a patient would have wanted
treatment removed under the circumstances, challengers should
present proof that the patient would have wanted to continue
treatment. When a patient's preferences are not known, only the
interests of others can really be served.'29 Reframing the issue focuses
on objective and subjective benefits to the patient, and avoids the
fiction of substituted judgment.
B. Futility in End-of-Life Decisionmaking
According to the American Medical Association (AMA),
physicians are not ethically obligated to deliver care that, in their best
professional judgment, will not have a reasonable chance of
benefiting their patients."3 Sometimes a physician's best professional
judgment conflicts with the preference of the patient, and in those
cases the AMA recommends that the patient's preference should
prevail.' Interestingly, the AMA's ethical guidelines on withholding
or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment only specifically

128. See Shepherd, supra note 124, at 658 (arguing that if we do not focus on the
benefit to the P.V.S. patient, or the lack of the P.V.S. patient's interest to live, then
we lose sight of other interests actually being served).
129. See id. at 667 (arguing that financial, ideological, and personal interests of
others improperly influence decisions to continue treating P.V.S. patients).
130. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA's Code of Medical Ethics:
Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion E-2.035 Futile Care,
available at <www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8389.html>; see also BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 303 (4th ed. 2001)
(defining treatment as scientifically futile when "it cannot achieve the medical result
that is expected by the patient (or by the family) making the request").
131. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA's Code of Medical Ethics:
Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion E-2.20 Withholding
or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, available at <www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/8457.html>.
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address the scenario where a patient wishes to forego treatment
against the advice of the doctor. 32 The guidelines do not address
situations in which family members of a P.V.S. patient would like to
continue treatment which the physician deems futile.
Although most people generally agree upon the principle of
futility, consensus regarding which treatment situations constitute
futility is far from absolute. The AMA guidelines do acknowledge
that when further intervention to prolong the life of a patient
becomes futile, necessary value judgments should be made by
physicians. 33 The physician should not "prolong the dying process
without benefit to the patient or to others with legitimate interests."
The continual emergence of life-sustaining technology fuels the
debate about how and by whom treatment choices should be made.'3
Until recently, cases about futility of life-sustaining medical care
were typically brought by patients or families seeking to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment because treatment is no longer of any
benefit. 3 1 Consistent with rights-based constitutional law, courts have
generally concluded that patients have a negative right to be let alone
and to refuse treatment.1 6 As physicians have increasingly acted on
lessons about such cases and recommend that treatment be removed
on futility grounds, surrogates and family members sometimes resist
and insist that treatment be administered despite lack of benefit to
the patient.1 37 Instead of freedom from treatment, in these cases the
patient or family members insist on the right to treatment9

132. Id. ("[Tlhe principle of patient autonomy requires that physicians respect the
decision to forego life-sustaining treatment of a patient who possesses decisionmaking capacity.").
133. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA's Code of Medical Ethics:
Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion E-2.037 Medical
Futility in End-of-Life Care, available at <www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8390.
html>.
134. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Forward to MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE
EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS ix, x (Marjorie B. Zucker &
Howard D. Zucker eds. 1997).
135. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 530 (2nd ed., Wiley Law Publications 1995)
(1989).
136. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914); MEISEL,
supra note 134, at 546.
137. MEISEL, supra note 135, at 531.
138. Id. For example, in In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the parents of
an anencephalic newborn insisted on respiratory support despite generally accepted
medical practice that anencephaly is not curable or treatable and life support is futile.
Anencephalic infants are born missing most of their brains, with only the brain stem,
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By framing the issue of treatment decisions around the right to
be let alone, the courts have set themselves up to decide whether
patients now have a positive right to receive treatment, a kind of right
not generally recognized in our system of law. Courts do not usually
address the central issue of whether the physician has power to
exercise professional judgment in refusing treatment. The most
sensible approach to the issue of treatment would incorporate our
doctrine of futility with the "best interest" approach taken by
countries such as England.
C. Advance Directives and Input From Family Members
The use of advance directives and framing end-of-life care
around liberty interests establishes the dying process squarely within
the U.S. tradition of civil liberties. However singularly considering
the patient's interest in autonomy when making treatment decisions
leaves family members as mere channels of the patient's wishes.
Concerns of family members are formally ignored by the law, and
patients' loved ones become invisible in the dying process. Most
people do not want this. Rather most Americans hope that family
members will make end-of-life treatment decisions for them if
needed.'39 Americans may be reluctant to create advance directives
because they prefer not to think about end-of-life decisions, but they
may also believe that such decisions could be handled by loved ones.
Patients also generally want family members to take their own
interests into account if they must make such treatment decisions.'
Those that do create advance directives probably do so to make
things easier for family members should they ever become
incompetent.
Some people may also implicitly express their
consideration for family members with the choices they make. For
example, one might appoint a family member other than a parent in
order to spare the parent a difficult decision about terminating

which controls regulatory functions, intact. The court ruled that the hospital must
administer life support under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA), which requires that patients seeking emergency treatment not be
turned away until they are stabilized and transferred to another facility. The hospital
in this case could not find another facility to accept the infant and she lived at the
hospital until the age of two and a half. See Tricia L. Romesberg, Futile Care and the
Neonate, 3(5) ADVANCES IN NEONATAL CARE 213, § 4 (2003), available at
<www.medscape.com/viewarticle/464018_4>.
139. See Shepherd, supra note 44, at 583.
140. Id.
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treatment. So when family members consider their own interests,
they are also likely furthering the self-interest of the patient.
Without abandoning the rights of patients to determine
healthcare decisions, advance directives could be used more as a
guide for surrogates and family members in determining treatment,
especially when present circumstances do not resemble those
anticipated by the patient. And if an incompetent patient has not
prepared an advance directive, then surrogates or family members,
along with physicians, should not be forced to create "evidence" of
the patient's wishes. In his article, Sharing Death and Dying, Ho Mun
Chan proposes the creation of a new default whereby the physician
would follow the wishes of the family unless the patient had clearly
expressed otherwise." 1 This way, the family would not have absolute
authority in the decisionmaking process, but in the case of an
incompetent patient, families would not have to find proof of the
patient's wishes. Other family members or concerned persons, such
as healthcare providers, could challenge the decision in a case where
they believed the decision was not made in the best interest of the
patient.
Conclusion
The legislation proposed in the wake of the Schiavo case is
primarily reactionary.1 42 The premise of the suggested laws rests on
the notion that contentious issues involved in end-of-life
decisionmaking could be resolved if either (1) everyone created an
advance directive, or (2) the state controlled the types of treatment
that could be withheld and chose who has authority to withhold that
treatment. These proposals miss an opportunity to change the
underlying framework of our approach to end-of-life care.
In order to make the best decisions for P.V.S. patients and their
families, those involved must recognize the unique circumstances of
the terminal condition. Approaching end-of-life care from a "best
interest" perspective (which includes a patient's interest in selfdetermination) rather than from strictly a patient-rights perspective
would more honestly and adequately address the needs of both
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141. Chan, supra note 105, at 102-3.
142. See recent legislation proposed and passed, supra notes 68-73.
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approach to decisionmaking, marks a step in the right direction.
Both Schiavo's husband and parents purported to represent what
she would have wanted under the circumstances. The decisions each
party would have made on her behalf would have resulted in
opposing results, those results being either her death or her continued
existence in a persistent vegetative state. Instead of steadfastly
adhering to the myth that we can somehow know what the patient
would have wanted in absence of a clear directive, we should
incorporate some of the methods utilized in countries that value an
objective perspective of the patient's best interests and wishes of the
patient's family members. Although personal autonomy is an
important factor, it is only one in a range of interests that should be
considered in making end-of-life treatment decisions.
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